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The 1999-2006 versions of the Italian Domestic Stability Pact had many
shortcomings and a modest impact with respect to the aim of aligning the
fiscal behaviour of sub-national government units with the national
commitments under the European Stability and Growth Pact. The Domestic
Pact was revised in 2007 and 2008 to tighten the monitoring and sanctions
framework and prevent some inefficient behaviour. However, some
undesirable features still mar the new regime: no coordination exists between
the Domestic Pact and the debt and tax constraints applied to local
governments; a clear definition of the contribution of sub-national
governments to aggregate compliance with the external rule is still lacking;
flexibility has been introduced by means of an artificial reference budget
balance; side effects on resource redistribution are ignored; and monitoring
and sanctioning remain weak. Remedies for the above shortcomings can
possibly be found in the domestic pacts of the other EMU countries. Most of all,
the Domestic Pact should be adjusted to the specific characteristics of fiscal
decentralization in Italy, where a large fiscal gap exists, revenue autonomy is
constrained and a large share of the responsibility for spending is rigid and
politically sensitive.
1. Introduction1
The constraints imposed on the public finances by the Stability and
Growth Pact force the EMU countries to control their budget balances
and the stock of debt with reference to general government, i.e. to the
consolidated accounts of central government, local government and
social security institutions. Control of the public finances thus requires
the cooperation of a wide range of entities and not just the commitment
of the central government, even though the latter is the only body
2 On the problems of the approach to intergovernmental fiscal relationships, see, among others,
Ter-Minassian and Craig (1997), Pisauro (2001), Dafflon (2002), Rossi and Dafflon (2002), and
Ahmad et al. (2005).
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directly responsible at European level for the results of the public
finances. This situation is therefore a problem of the supply of a public
good: in the absence of incentives, constraints and sanctions
encouraging the other entities to contribute their part to the supply of
the public good “sound public finances,” the ultimate responsibility for
financing its production falls on the central government. To guarantee
that all the entities called upon to contribute to the results of the public
finances do not engage in opportunistic conduct, the EMU countries
have laid down various rules of financial coordination known as
Domestic Stability Pacts, which are imposed on or agreed with the
sector that is most important for the general government budget
balances, i.e. local government.
This work provides a preliminary analysis of the various ways in
which the sub-national rules are drawn up in general and the
possible ways of sharing an external objective at local level (Section
2). Section 3 presents the characteristics of the main sub-national
rules adopted by the EMU countries. Section 4 introduces the
discussion with reference to Italy, describes the characteristics of
Italian decentralization that are relevant to the choice of the fiscal
rules for the local authorities, looks at the Domestic Stability Pact
rules in force from 1999 and 2006, and presents an assessment of the
fiscal rules on the basis of the results of the consolidated accounts.
The latest version of the Domestic Stability Pact, introduced in 2007
and corrected in 2008, is described and discussed in Section 5.
Section 6 contains the main conclusions.
2. General models of sub-national rules
Rules for coordinating between different levels of government are
often adopted in developed countries to regulate financial
relationships in contexts of fiscal federalism.2 Their purpose is to
guarantee both macroeconomic stability at national level and the
advantages, in terms of greater efficiency, of decentralization at
local level (Joumard et al., 2005, p.5). The utility of fiscal rules at 
3 The term “local” refers to local and regional governments, whereas the term “sub-national” also
includes federal states.
4 The policy indication provided by Wildasin (1997) is to fragment the levels of government even
further to the point of creating jurisdictions that are so small the central government can allow
them to fail, since the level of local public goods they provide does not produce the sizable and
important positive externalities that are produced instead by larger entities and that protect them
from the central government’s no-bail-out threat. Alternatively, he suggests the use of more
generous transfers by the central government than would be justified under a purely efficiency-
based approach, thus avoiding the creation of deficits and the consequent make-good
intervention by the central government. In short, a second-best solution with inefficient transfers,
but without a make-good intervention is indicated as preferable for the collectivity to a second-
best solution with efficient transfers accompanied by a bail-out. Pisauro (2001) observes,
however, that these measures would aggravate the problem of the common pool.
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local or sub-national level3 nonetheless varies with the country’s
decentralization structure and above all with the nature of the
financial links between entities at different levels. Among the most
important elements is the presence or absence of wide fiscal gaps
(or vertical fiscal imbalances) at sub-national level, or in other
words of a large difference between the expenditure assigned and
revenue competences, which is financed by central transfers,
(Rodden, 2002, p. 672).
The existence of fiscal gaps gives rise, in fact, to a divergence
between the local and national opportunity costs of using public funds
and therefore encourages excessive local expenditure because it is
financed in part by the common pool of state taxes (Weingast et al.,
1981). In addition, there is a problem of moral hazard deriving from the
insurance effect provided by the presence of a higher-level
government entity, the central government, that, faced with local
deficits, will eventually intervene with special transfers to make good
the deficits or by taking over the liabilities; the ultimate effect is a
loosening of the local entity’s budget constraint. In fact even an explicit
no-bail-out commitment by the central government cannot be
considered credible; the government cannot leave sub-national entities
in a state of financial collapse, both because they are “too big to fail”
(Wildasin, 1997)4 and because support measures are preferable,
including from the standpoint of maximizing the social welfare of the
federation (Persson and Tabellini, 1996; Bordignon et al. 2001). If,
moreover, the local entities have access to the capital markets, the fiscal
gap causes private investors to expect that the state will act as the
guarantor of last resort for their debt: the cost of debt is thus also
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increased for the decentralized entities, together with the volatility of
public expenditure and tax rates.
In short, a wide fiscal gap allows local entities to offload the costs of
their fiscal irresponsibility onto the collectivity. This prospect and the
impossibility of eliminating the problem of moral hazard suggest the
adoption of stringent sub-national fiscal rules (Eichengreen and von
Hagen, 1996; Rodden, 2002), which are less necessary, instead, when
the decentralized entities enjoy a more balanced assignment of
revenue and expenditure powers: the paradigmatic models are the
Swiss cantons and the Canadian federation. However, not even this
model of fiscal federalism is exempt from the need for central
intervention, linked in particular to the assignment of adequate tax
bases, the danger of excessive tax competition and a greater sensitivity
to the economic cycle, which exposes local authorities to the risk of
accumulating deficits in the negative phases of the cycle. Last but not
least, the closing of the fiscal gap does not increase sub-national
entities’ perception of the effects their fiscal choices produce at
aggregate level or eliminate the problem of moral hazard: “closing the
gap does not necessarily mean closing access to the pool [of tax
resources]” (Pisauro, 2002, p.706).
There are many fiscal rules applicable at sub-national level, although
none is fully effective in controlling local public finances or exempt
from the risk of being evaded.
- Rules on budget balances: These are the most commonly applied,
with variations in terms of the type of budget considered (forecast,
approved, outturn with or without losses carried forward); they
have the advantage of being simple but they can be meaningless if
some revenue and expenditure items are excluded and if it proves
impossible to prevent others from being classified as off-budget
items.
- Expenditure caps: These are found in the form of ceilings on total or
current expenditure or specific expenditure items. On their own
they do not make it possible to prevent the formation of debt if
some items are managed off-budget, and they can cause allocative
inefficiencies if, in order to comply with the ceiling, sub-national
entities reduce the expenditure that is most flexible in the short
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term, i.e. investment expenditure. Moreover, the fact that local
entities are entrusted with politically sensitive expenditure (health
care, education, services for old and disabled people, etc.) makes it
very difficult to make cuts and thus to comply with the ceilings.
Among other things, local public expenditure, precisely because
very often it is for personal services, suffers from Baumol’s cost
disease, which prevents cost reductions and the overall compliance
with the cap.
- Ceilings on the own revenue of sub-national entities: These can be
used both to limit or freeze the authorities’ ability to alter tax rates or
reliefs, often as a way of punishing non-compliant entities, and to
cap the revenue obtainable from a given tax base.
- Limits on the stock of debt or on the issuance of new debt: These are
often couched in numerical form and are sometimes accompanied
by a request for administrative authorizations and guarantees. They
can be evaded by transferring debt to other general government
entities that are not subject to the limits or to local public enterprises
outside general government and by engaging in sale-and-lease-
back operations.
- Restrictions on the type of expenditure that can be financed with
debt: These generally state that only investment expenditure can be
financed with debt (the golden rule). In this way the current
account is separated from the capital account, with the current
account balance including debt service, i.e. interest payments and
repayments of principal on the basis of a rule of the pay-as-you-use
type. Such restrictions require an unambiguous definition of
investment expenditure so as to avoid the transfer of current
expenditure items to capital expenditure. Moreover, they do not
appear to be able to guarantee the macroeconomic sustainability of
the debt (Dafflon, 2002). The second problem could be overcome
by a rule that excludes capital expenditure from the balance but
restricts it in the aggregate for the various sectors (Balassone, Degni
and Salvemini, 2002).
- Limits on the debt linked to the cost of debt service or indicators of
the ability to service the debt (own revenue, tax bases): These may
not be effective in curbing debt if the financial conditions are
distorted or manipulated.
5 “Such practices include for instance: the reclassification of expenditures from current to capital,
to escape current budget balance requirements; the creation of entities whose operations - albeit
of a governmental nature - are kept off-budget, and whose debts are not counted against the debt
ceilings; the use of state or local government-owned enterprises to borrow for purposes that
should be funded through the relevant government budget; the use of debt instruments – such as
sale and leaseback arrangements – that are not included in the debt limits; the resort to arrears to
suppliers, which are typically difficult to monitor for inclusion in the public debt ceilings” (Ter-
Minassian and Craig, 1997, p. 166).
6 Dafflon (2002) stresses the need for the time horizon required for the rebalancing of the budget
to correspond with the time horizon of local level administrative mandates: if these periods fail to
coincide, a phenomenon of financial illusion would be introduced together with an incentive for
local politicians to overspend. Moreover, if the adjustment in the early years of the period
considered were modest, it would have to be much larger in the last year of the constraint’s
application, so that it would risk not being sustainable by the local government.
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The combination of more than one restriction is appropriate when
just one, particularly rigid, constraint might give rise to undesirable
conduct by sub-national entities: procyclical fiscal conduct, i.e.
increases in expenditure in the positive phases of the cycle
accompanied by increases in fiscal pressure in the negative phases
(ratchet effect), budgetary window-dressing,5 and the curbing of
investment expenditure. The literature suggests overcoming these
drawbacks by combining ceilings on budgetary balances with a
restriction on own revenue or by defining the balance net of
investment expenditure or, lastly, by adopting objectives that are not
annual but defined in the medium term so as to permit the offsetting of
surpluses and deficits.6 The need for more flexible constraints can also
be met by introducing safeguard clauses or contingency funds, though
these may require very large sums to be set aside that to some extent
undermine the disciplinary effect of the rule.
However they are configured, the tax rules must constitute a credible
commitment on the part of local and national governments. Numerous
factors contribute to this, first and foremost how they are established
(self-imposition, decisions by central government, multilateral
bargaining), the ex ante and ex post monitoring of budgetary data, the
ways in which budget forecasts are made, the existence of an
independent audit system, the disclosure of data and the sanctions
imposed on non-compliant entities. In particular, some types of
sanctions are likely not to appear very credible – not only those that are
clearly disproportionate, but also those of a financial nature, since,
owing to the inevitable problem of moral hazard, an entity in greater
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difficulty is more and not less likely to receive additional help (Joumard
et al. 2005).
Not only administrative procedures can discipline local governments’
fiscal conduct but so can financial markets by limiting access to
financing or increasing the cost of debt (Breton, 1977). However, this
disciplinary effect is produced under particularly stringent conditions
that are rarely met in practice regarding the availability of information,
the openness of markets, and the absence of moral hazard. Moreover,
there is the problem of the lag or limited reactivity with which local
administrators perceive market signals, which are subject to sudden
discontinuities (Ahmad et al., 2005).
To conclude, the choice of sub-national fiscal rules should be made
in relation to the objectives to be achieved (containing the size of the
local public sector, sharing of external constraints, sustainability of the
debt, an incentive for allocative efficiency) and, where there are several
objectives, there should be several mutually consistent rules. In
particular, if one of the objectives is to share an external constraint,
such as the Growth and Stability Pact, between different levels, it is
necessary to inquire into the possible forms this domestic rule can take
in a decentralized system. In order to be consistent, the domestic rules
must replicate, in some respects, the structure of the external constraint
(e.g. objectives expressed in terms of the same variables, the use of
data comparable to those of the national accounts, and congruent time
horizons). In particular, since the external objective is a budget
balance, it would be desirable, especially in decentralized structures
where there is some degree of local fiscal autonomy, for the domestic
control variable also to be a balance and not, say, a cap on
expenditure. Moreover, since the purpose of the constraint is to control
the general government balance and not the size of the public sector, a
constraint applied to balances should not be accompanied by severe
restrictions on fiscal autonomy. In fact, insofar as the fiscal rules are
applied in a context of decentralization, they must leave margins of
autonomy with regard to revenue and expenditure decisions. In line
with the structure of the external constraint, it would appear most
suitable to supplement it with constraints on the balances and debt of
the local entities.
The sharing of an external objective gives rise to the problem of
7 For Italy, such a proposal was supported by Bosi et al. (2003).
8 For Italy, such a proposal was supported by Commissione Tecnica per la Spesa Pubblica (2001)
and by Giarda et al. (2005), with special reference to debt financing of municipalities’ capital
expenditure. More recently the proposal has been discussed again in ISAE (2007).
44
Francesca Gastaldi and Luisa Giuriato
determining the contribution that each category must make to the
collective effort. This can be done either by establishing the share of
deficit and/or debt reduction to be borne by each category (regional
and municipal governments) or by establishing only the share required
from the highest level in the hierarchy of sub-national entities
(regions/states); the choice between the two models depends on the
types of relationship existing between the various levels of government.
In the first case (Figure 1a) each category of local government must
find, in turn, a way of sharing the objective internally.7 In the second
case (Figure 1b) the category of regional/state entities will establish the
share of each region/state and these, in turn, will agree the
contributions required from each lower level entity belonging to its
jurisdiction. The system of monitoring and control also depends on the
type of sharing of the external constraint chosen: in the first case forms
of peer pressure are important while in the second it should require the
intervention of the higher-level local entity.
The ways of sharing the objective within each category or higher
local entity must take account of the structural disequilibria between
the different areas (Bosi et al, 2003) and can be defined either as part
of a formalized process of cooperation or with more sophisticated
methods, such as the creation of a market in deficit permits (Casella,
1999)8 in which entities compare the cost of reducing their own
deficit with the market price of permits and these are exchanged by
way of direct bargaining or auctions. This mechanism could allow an
efficient allocation of deficits and be regulated on the basis of the
central government’s macroeconomic objectives. It is open to some
methodological criticisms, however (Patrizii et al., 2006; Rossi and
Dafflon, 2002; Balassone and Franco, 2001), especially as regards the
initial distribution of permits, the need for sufficient competition in
the market for permits, the hypothesis of perfect substitutability
between entities’ deficits, and the distortions introduced by
considerations of a political nature that can influence the decision to
buy permits.
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3. Models applied in Europe
The various EMU countries have followed many different paths in
attempting to make the fiscal policies of their decentralized entities
consistent with the constraints of the Stability and Growth Pact: in
some cases marginal changes have been made to existing rules; in
others new rules have been introduced in a specific legislative context.
In some countries the need for the decentralized entities to contribute
to achieving the aggregate objective arose even before the start of
EMU. In the mid-1990s Austria, Belgium, Germany and Spain already
had a level of local deficit that contributed to causing total deficit to
diverge from the Maastricht target (Table 1). The fiscal rules introduced
at that time did not always bring the intended results. In the last ten
years Austria and Belgium have turned the local government balance
into a structural surplus. The consolidation of the budgetary balance in
Spain was due instead to the results obtained by the central
government and the social security institutions, while the deficit of the
autonomous communities (regions) was not reduced significantly and
the local governments, which had been in balance in 1995, recorded a
small deficit from 2002 onwards. In Germany the deficit of the Länder
continues to represent an important share of the total net deficit. In
other countries the problem of the consistency between the external
objective and the fiscal conduct of the decentralized entities emerged
after the start of EMU (Finland and the Netherlands).
As regards consolidated debt, the local component is less than ten
per cent of the total in some countries (Austria, Belgium, France and
Italy); in the Netherlands and Spain, its share is about 15 per cent, while
in Germany it is about 40 per cent. In general the last ten years have
seen a tendency for the share of local government debt to decline,
whereas, as will be seen in Section 5, the tendency in Italy has been in
the opposite direction, with local government debt rising from 4.3 per
cent of the total in 1995 to 7.3 per cent in 2005.
This range of results is due to a variety of factors, but it is possible to
identify the main factors in each of the paths followed by the countries
considered in disciplining and coordinating the budgetary results at the
different levels of government.
As shown in Section 2, the value of fiscal rules at local and sub-
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national level varies with the structure of decentralization and the
nature of the financial links between the entities at the different levels.
The degree of decentralization, measured in terms of the amount of
expenditure managed at local level, is generally used as an indicator of
the extent of fiscal federalism. Among the countries considered,
Belgium, Germany, Finland and Spain can be considered as the most
decentralized, with local government’s share of total expenditure
ranging from 39.4 per cent in Finland to 53.4 per cent in Spain. In the
last 10 years the degree of decentralization has on average increased in
all the countries considered except the Netherlands (Table 2).
On the financing side the total share of sub-national entities’ own
taxes is generally small (between 10 and 30 per cent of local tax
revenue), compared with the use of instruments of derivative finance
such as vertical and horizontal transfers and tax sharing, thus reducing
the  financial responsibility of sub-national entities. However, the
decentralization of revenue has been considerable both in Spain and in
Italy (Table 2). Moreover, the autonomy implicit in own taxes and  tax
sharing depends also on the freedom that is granted at the local level in
determining tax rates, the tax base and tax reliefs. The potential fiscal
effort is very limited in Austria and Germany. Instead, Belgium and
Spain and most of the unitary countries enjoy greater fiscal autonomy.
Spain has a high degree of fiscal autonomy compared with the other
countries considered, with tax rates and bases that can be manoeuvred
in excess of 50 per cent of the revenue for the regions and 77 per cent
for the local authorities (Table 2). Consequently, if Spain is excluded,
in most of the countries, and especially in Austria and Germany,
responsibility for expenditure does not appear to be matched by
sufficient responsibility on the financing side, thus potentially
generating common pool fund problems.
As regards the constraints, all the EMU countries have set a constraint
on the annual budget balance, both at the levels of intermediate
government (federal states or regions) and at the lower levels (local
governments). Austria, Spain, Finland and Belgium have introduced a
multi-year time frame, complying with the objectives established at
national level in the various European Stability Programmes. In
Germany, the Netherlands, France and Finland the compass of the
constraint at the lower level is limited to the current account balance,
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while in Austria and Spain the constraint includes some off-budget
items (Table 3).
In most countries the constraints on the balance are accompanied by
constraints on the debt of the local entities fixed by the higher level of
government; by contrast, this is explicitly excluded in Belgium and the
Netherlands, but the possibility of borrowing can be limited if the
balanced budget constraint is not complied with. In Spain the
constraint on the debt is self-imposed; in France, Germany and Spain
debt is subject to the golden rule at the local government level. In
France and Germany the constraint is numerical for the issue of new
debt, while in Spain there is also a ceiling on the stock. In Belgium the
constraint is expressed in terms of a restriction on interest payments. In
all the countries recourse to local government debt is restricted to
certain uses of the funds and is often subject to central government
approval. In Finland there is no constraint on the debt. Constraints on
expenditure are much less common and, among the countries
considered, only Germany and Belgium have provided, as an
additional measure, a ceiling on the growth of expenditure at the local
level. Although there is no specific rule for revenue, the degree of fiscal
autonomy constitutes an implicit constraint on the financing of local
entities. The application of a minimum (or standard) rate and a
maximum rate for local taxes amounts to respectively a lower and an
upper limit on the entities’ fiscal revenue. The Netherlands does not
provide for any restriction on tax rates and the same is true of Finland
for most local and revenue-sharing taxes.
As regards the various methods used to define the constraints, it is
possible to distinguish the countries that have used a cooperative
approach (Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands) from those, such
as Italy, that have imposed budgetary rules. In some countries (Austria
and Spain) the rules are not imposed but negotiated.
In 1992 Belgium, as part of its plan to converge on the Maastricht
parameters, began to coordinate its budgetary objectives at the
different levels of government. In particular, the CSF (Conseil
Supérieur des Finances), whose members include representatives of
the federal government, the regional government (3 regions and 3
linguistic communities) and local government (10 provinces and 589
municipalities), established, in a process of cooperation between the
9 In addition to the federal government, the Constitution provides for 16 regions (Länder) e 13,000
municipalities.
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centre and peripheral entities, the contribution of each level of
government to the budget constraint defined in the convergence plan.
The objective for all the levels of local government has been fixed,
since 1999, as a balanced budget; and an agreement of 2005 provides
for the budgets of the regions and the municipalities to be in surplus.
No special constraints are envisaged on the issue of debt by individual
local entities, but the definition of the balanced budget and the results
in terms of surpluses in the last few years have clearly contributed to a
sizable reduction in the debt at local level, both as a ratio to GDP and as
a share of total debt.
The cooperative approach has not produced such satisfactory results
in Germany.9 The assignment of responsibilities to the decentralized
bodies is not well specified, so there is a strong incentive for free
riding. In particular, management of most of the devolved functions is
shared between the federal and regional governments, which reduces
transparency in the assignment of roles and specific government
accountability. Further, the principle of linkage between administrative
functions and financial costs, combined with the relative lack of local
financial autonomy, engenders moral hazard and the host of problems
connected with the common pool fund. A Financial Planning Council
was instituted to coordinate budget planning between the federal
government, regional governments, and other local bodies. Based on
an agreement the Council puts forward suggestions to define the
budget targets. In any event, both the federal government and the
regions remain independent and autonomous in setting their budget
policies; their only constraint is accounting equilibrium. As for debt
constraints, like a number of other countries Germany has instituted a
golden rule for local government budgets. In the mid-1990s the
relatively relaxed local budget constraints and the existing
coordination procedures began to seem insufficient to ensure
compliance with European rules. Following the financial difficulties
that emerged in 2001, in 2002 a new agreement was reached setting the
objective of a balanced budget in the medium term both for the federal
government and for the Länder and enhancing the coordination
10 The Austrian federal state comprises 9 regions (Länder) e 2,359 local communities, and the
constitution mandates the sharing between federal and regional governments of the functions
relating to state sovereignty, while all functions not attributed directly to the central government
are automatically the responsibility of the regions. Local administrations are responsible for
administrative functions delegated to them from higher levels. As in Germany, this federal
structure produces greater problems in controlling local budgets. In Austria it generated fiscal
gaps generally in favour of the local governments until the mid-1990s, but the situation was then
inverted and local governments began to run deficits.
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functions of the Financial Planning Council with specific regard to
European constraints. The Council is empowered to rule on local
government budgets’ compliance with the Stability Programme and to
make recommendations to correct their fiscal behaviour. Further, federal
government, Länder and municipalities agreed on the division of the net
borrowing target between levels of government: 45 per cent to the
federal government and the remaining 55 per cent to regional and local
authorities. Finally, a spending curb was instituted both at federal and at
regional level so as to achieve the general government budget balance.
Consensus and cooperation also play a major role in another country
in which formal budget rules apply, namely Austria.10 All levels of
government must do their share to achieve budget equilibrium,
through the machinery of the “fiscal sharing act”. The objective is to
ensure the financial sustainability of the expenditure for which each
entity is responsible. The need to involve local governments in meeting
the Maastricht standards resulted in a first informal agreement in 1996
and a proper “Domestic Stability Pact” in 1999. As a preliminary, the
proportions in which the various levels of government must contribute
to deficit reduction are set for the entire duration of the Pact. The
various contributions are quantified on the basis of deficit targets for
each year. For local administrations, the distribution is not by
individual entity but according to resident population and the
economic condition of the region to which the entities belong. This
mechanism makes it possible to negotiate deficit shares between
regions, between the local governments within each region, and
between the entire set of local governments in one region and in
another. It also permits budget coordination, ensuring a certain degree
of flexibility. Coordination is on two planes: one involving different
institutional levels and a second, through Committees, involving
relations between individual regions and the local governments within
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them. The process involves setting budget targets and short-term fiscal
policy objectives and monitoring deficits and debt, for prompt
detection of any overall excessive deficit of the general government.
The Committees suggest adjustment measures and if necessary decide
on the sharing of any penalties.
Spain also has a fiscal rule, but here too cooperation is decisive. In the
last few years very extensive decentralization has been carried out, but
there has been a narrowing of the fiscal gap and a reduction of moral
hazard for local governments, making it possible to reconcile
decentralization with budget stability at sub-national level. During the
1990s fiscal policy for different levels of government (17 autonomous
communities, or regions, and 8,102 municipalities) was based on
coordination under the Fiscal and Financial Policy Council, with
representatives of the Autonomous Communities. The Council also had
the purpose of coordinating investment and debt policies and resource
distribution. Constraints were set, mainly on debt issuance. Local
governments were subject to the golden rule and to central authorization,
and interest payments could not exceed 25 per cent of current revenues.
These constraints did not prove to be particularly effective, and the
control of local budgets was achieved mainly on the expenditure side,
through bilateral negotiations that were lacking in transparency. In 2001
the need to institutionalize coordination induced Spain, too, to pass a
national law instituting a Domestic Stability Pact (Ley General de
Estabilidad Presupuestaria). The central government unilaterally sets the
consolidated budget target and the overall objective for each level of
government, based on a multi-year plan approved by Parliament and
subject to the oversight of the Council. The Council and the National
Commission of Local Administrations are responsible for allotting the
deficit and debt targets among the various entities. The different levels of
government pledged to maintain budget balance or surplus, but each
local authority retains full independence in budgetary decisions. The Pact
was revised in 2005 to attenuate some elements of  rigidity that might
create incentives for pro-cyclical policy and reduce budget transparency
through off-budget transactions. For the central and sub-national
governments, budget balance was no longer defined on a yearly basis but
over three years, in accordance with economic forecasts. As an exception,
the central government, the Autonomous Communities and largest city
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governments may run additional deficits to fund investment projects (the
golden rule). Further, negotiations were envisaged to set the general
objectives for the various levels of government, with the institution of a
phase of bilateral consultations between Autonomous Communities and
central government and the reinforcement of the role of the  Fiscal and
Financial Policy Council of the Autonomous Communities and of the
National Commission of Local Administrations.
The differences in the achievements of the Domestic Stability Pacts
depend in part on procedural features, in particular the monitoring of
results. In Belgium, responsibility for the overall budget outturn of local
governments is assigned to the federal states (regions). The Conseil
Supérieur des Finances is responsible  for monitoring fiscal policy in the
regions and checking its execution, in concert with the regions and
municipalities, through monthly exchange of data. Control on budget
equilibrium at municipal level is assigned to the provinces, which also
have the power to impose budget adjustments (spending cuts or tax
increases) where the objectives are not met. The budget targets are made
more credible by the presence of an independent agency, the Federal
Planning Bureau, for forecasting macroeconomic and budget variables
for the federal budget process. Austria and the Netherlands also have
independent institutes, and in those countries there is, on average, less
deviation of budget and economic outturns from the initial forecasts.
In Spain the checking of budget objectives is entrusted to a central
government agency that is generally responsible for public accounting.
The Finance Mininstry monitors the financial adjustment plans that the
Autonomous Communities must present yearly. The Fiscal and Financial
Policy Council, however, has the power to verify the implementation of
devolution and compliance with fiscal rules at regional level. To tighten
monitoring, the revised Domestic Stability Pact provides that in
preparing their budgets the various administrations must supply all
information necessary to verify their compatibility with the targets; the
information must be made available through a public database.
In Germany, it is the procedure itself that appears to weaken the
Domestic Stability Pact. Hierarchical ex-post controls of compliance
with the objectives is lacking, since budgets are subject only to checks
at the same level of government, while the State Audit Office carries out
only administrative controls. City governments, in their budget
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process, are considered as parts of their region, and their budget
policies are subject to the monitoring of the interior ministry of that
region. Germany shows, on average, a wider discrepancy between
forecasts and outturns, presumably due to a relative lack of
independence in making macroeconomic forecasts and to the fact that
the budget is drafted and the outturn measured on a cash rather than
on an accrual basis.
Ex post reconstructing the accounts according to ESA95 standards
weakens the procedure for setting targets and, even more so,
undermines budget control not only in Germany but also in France and
Italy. In the other countries, there is a mounting effort to make the
budget targets at the different levels of government consistent with the
consolidated budget objective set in the stability programme. In this
regard, Belgium, Austria and Spain refer more explicitly to accounts
drafted according to ESA95.
Sanction procedures differ considerably from country to country.
Austria, Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands and Spain provide for
financial sanctions, such as reduced transfers, and/or administrative
penalties, such as the limitation of financial independence. In Belgium
the regions are subject to a sanction mechanism, and the Conseil
Supérieur des Finances can ask the federal government to limit their
borrowing capacity. In Spain and the Netherlands, local governments’
access to credit depends on having a balanced budget. 
In general, when there is a violation, deviations from the adjustment
plan have to be justified, but in Finland, France, Germany and the
Netherlands no explicit sanctions are provided for. Among the
countries examined here, only Spain and Austria provide for the
allotment of a European sanction between the non-compliant
jurisdictions. In Spain, the criterion for allotment is decided ex post. In
Austria, the sanction applies, with joint and several liability, to all the
entities, but this has proved not a particularly credible system for
eliminating free riding. As a rule, these collective sanctions are an
incentive to maintain a balance between regional surpluses and deficits
but do not rule out the possibility that it will always be the same surplus
regions to offset regularly excessive deficits in others. That is, this
mechanism takes no account of the fiscal sustainability of individual
entities, much less of the quality of their spending (ISAE, 2007). Spain
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also has a no-bail-out clause that explicitly rules out any obligation on
the part of the central government to salvage insolvent local
governments. Austria has a safeguard clause with respect to the budget
constraint only in the case of severe recession.
As an alternative to cooperation, local fiscal discipline can be
imposed from above, as in France, where during the 1990s a series of
laws were enacted offering a degree of fiscal decentralization, and
local financial autonomy was reinforced, but no real Domestic
Stabilty Pact was ever adopted. There are no limits on local debt, but
there are implicit constraints stemming from the balanced budget
rule and the investment accounting standards. On the one hand, the
rule requiring a balanced budget on current account makes
application of the golden rule mandatory. On the other, the charging
of depreciation to the capital account requires a current account
surplus to cover past investment, thus limiting new debt to the
financing of new investment only. Budget controls are
administrative and are performed by the local sections of the State
Audit Office (Chambre Régionale des Comptes). They examine both
the ex-ante and ex-post budget balance. If the deficit exceeds 5 or 10
per cent of current revenue (depending on population), the
Chambre must suggest corrective measures. The imposition of this
rule on local public finances involves some elements of risk, in that
the accounting aggregate to which it refers is not exhaustive of the
local budget, which also includes transactions of entities delegated
by the local authorities to perform certain functions that are outside
the consolidated budget (such as outsourcing, public entities created
jointly by more than one government, and unions of municipalities).
So far, local accounts do not appear to have been the source of any
serious concern for compliance with the EU constraints, but the
good performance at local level has been assured by central
government transfers in cases of budget difficulties. French
decentralization is marked by highly differentiated fiscal gaps that
require not only vertical but also horizontal transfers, and if
problems in complying with the European standards arise, unless
the institutional relationships and budget rules are modified, the
burden will continue to fall on the central government (Gilbert and
Guengant, 2002).
11 Direct central government investment spending is less than 0.4 per cent of GDP. But most of the
transfers to finance investment by other general government bodies come from the central
government budget.
12 For purposes of international comparison, however, it should be noted that such transfers
include VAT sharing, which some countries (Germany) count as own resources.
13 The technical reports accompanying draft finance acts give only indications on the effects in
terms of deficit reduction that should come from the application of the Domestic Stability Pact.
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4. The Domestic Stability Pact in Italy
Italy has moved very far towards decentralization in the last few years.
At present, sub-national governments are responsible for about a third of
total general government spending (Table 4). Especially significant is the
fact that some 80 per cent of direct general government investment
expenditure is effected by the local administrations, and 45.9 per cent (or
1.3 per cent of GDP) by municipalities alone.11 Capital expenditure thus
represents a significant portion of municipal and regional budgets (larger
for the former than for the latter), and it strongly affects overall budget
results, especially for municipalities (ISAE, 2007). These sub-national
authorities, moreover, have jurisdiction over some politically sensitive
spending items (health, education, welfare) and have a high degree of
structural rigidity on the spending side, especially the municipalities.
The tax or revenue powers assigned to the local authorities are still
very limited, however. Own taxes account for less than half of total
revenues, cover less than half of current spending, and are only partially
under the control of the local bodies. Since tariff revenues are still
relatively insignificant, central government transfers remain paramount.12
So there is a substantial fiscal gap, which the literature associates with
the need for stricter fiscal rules, joined with the necessity of
coordinating local finances in order to comply with the external
constraint of the Stability and Growth Pact. To resolve the problem of
free-riding in the provision of the public good “sound public finances,”
Italy has taken a top-down approch in which the contributions required
of the various segments of general government are not specified13 but
annual constraints are set on every single sub-national unit,
differentiated in some years between the regional and the other
authorities. This way of sharing the Stability and Growth Pact burden
derives essentially from the strong relations, including financial
relations, between the central government and each of the sub-national
14 In 2002 the Domestic Stability Pact for the regions was decided on as part of the State-Regions
accord on health expenditure of 8 August 2001 and formally enacted as Decree Law 347/2001. In
2007 the Pact was the subject of explicit negotiations between central government and local
authorities (26 September 2007).
15 By 31 March each year these authorities must agree with the Ministry of the Economy and
Finance on a three-year spending plan. Up to 2003 the agreement involved only current
expenditure (actual outlays). From 2005 on it covered capital spending as well (thus, actual
outlays and commitments) and was subject to the general limit of 2 per cent of spending or the
constraint applying to ordinary-statue regions. If no agreement is reached, the Domestic Stability
Pact rules for the other local authorities apply. The authorities themselves decide which regime to
apply to the smaller units within their territory. The accounts of the special-statue regions and
autonomous provinces too are subject to monitoring.
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units, which prefer to deal not with the authority immediately above
them but directly with the central government. The main defects of this
approach consist in the lack of clear specification of the objective that
the local authorities should attain and in the rigid constraints that are set
on the individual governments, which cannot effect any offsets between
one another (e.g. between municipalities) or within a jurisdiction (e.g.
the municipalities of a given region). They could even have incentives
for “creative accounting” (Ter-Minassian and Craig, 1997).
The rules of the Domestic Pact have always been determined during
the final phase of the budget process, i.e. when the size of the budget
adjustment is being decided. Only twice was the course of direct
negotiation with the local authorities taken.14 The lack of direct talks in
the initial phases of the budget process and of a clear prior agreement
between the parties has been one of the causes of the numerous ex-post
amendments to the Pact, year after year. As Table 5 shows, the entities
covered, the planning targets and how they are calculated, sanctions,
and type of monitoring all changed every year from 1999 to 2007.
4.1. The changing rules of the Domestic Stability Pact, 1999-2006.
Groping about in search of some kind of equilibrium, Italy made
practically yearly revisions of its Domestic Pact, which created
problems for local planning and imposed adjustment costs. The budget
constraint, originally identical for all sub-national units, was diversified
in 2002 between regions and other local authorities. In turn, some
municipalities and other local units with population below a given
threshold were excluded from compliance checks in some years.
Finally, since 2002 special rules have applied to the autonomous
provinces of Trento and Bolzano and to the special-statute regions.15
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Excepting the first two years of application, 1999 and 2000, when the
Pact required a reduction of the aggregate deficit on a current
programmes basis for the subject entities as a group, through 2006 it
required each unit to correct the budget balance from previous years or
else set a limit – expressed as a ceiling with respect to historical values
– on the growth of current expenditure. In particular, since 2002 the
constraint for regional governments consisted only in an expenditure
cap. As section 2 shows, the spending constraint actually only limits the
expansion of the local public sector and does not directly serve to share
the burden of the European pact. At least where it was combined with a
constraint on the budget balance, its presence within the Domestic Pact
was justified as a correction to the budget balance itself. Past outturns,
in fact, are not representative of an entity’s actual fiscal virtue, because
the scope for tax autonomy is so small and revenue and expenditure
trends are partially random. 
In 2005 and 2006, in line with the controlled growth of overall
general government spending, the Domestic Stability Pact was
rewritten for all sub-national entities, with a new constraint on their
expenditure calculated as a ceiling on spending growth, for the first
time including capital spending, and distinguishing between virtuous
and unvirtuous entities. For 2006, in addition, differentiation between
current and capital expenditure was required, the former to be
contained and the latter augmented, so as to improve the quality of
local govenrment spending.
Except for the first two years, the limits have always been determined
on the basis of historical expenditure, never referring to one-year
projections, the actual planning horizon of local authorities. Moreover,
a growing number of items have been excluded from the ceilings. For
regions, the exemption of health care expenditure restricts the Pact’s
applicability to just a third of total spending. The exemptions comprise
capital expenditure, a number of the least discretionary budget items
(e.g. transfer payment revenues and earmarked expenditure financed
by transfers), and extraordinary expenditure. Possible outsourcing of
public activities, prompted in part by the fiscal rules, has almost never
been considered. Only the 2002 Pact established a method of
calculating the reference values that included outsourced spending
(Law 448/2001, Article 24.4 bis).
16 Law 142/1990, later incorporated into the local government code (Legislative Decree 267/2000).
Law 403/1990 abolished the requirement that local authorities apply for credit first to the Deposits
and Loans Fund. Law 155/1989 made loans for local investment conditional upon approval of a
financial plan (additional conditions were laid down in Decree laws 504/1992 and 528/1993 and
Law 724/1994). Ministerial decree 152/1996 regulates securities issues by local authorities. 
17 At first the limit was 25 per cent (Article 204 of the local government code). It was lowered to 12
per cent in 2004 (Law 311/2004, Article 1.4) and then raised to 15 per cent in 2006 (Law 296/2006,
Article 1.698).
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What is more, the monitoring system has been extremely weak and at
first it relied mainly on a sort of peer pressure, with central government
controls applied only to the larger entities and a sample of smaller ones.
Information is neither complete nor timely. Moreover, it lacks
transparency. The accounting rules are not the same as those for the
European pact (ESA95). Sanctions have been quite mild and changeable,
ranging from a share in any EU fine (1999) to incentives for the virtuous
authorities in the form of lower interest rates on loans from the Deposits
and Loans Fund (2000-2001), to administrative prohibitions on non-
compliant units. Through 2007 publication of the list of non-compliant
entities was never envisaged, and the sanctions were never applied. 
The Pact’s constraints come on top of other external constraints on
local debt and taxes under earlier legislation or special clauses in the
national finance laws. The tax autonomy of sub-national government
units has always been partial, the possibility of determining the rates
and deductions on certain taxes being restricted to a very narrow
range. In some years (2003-2005) these limits were transformed into
outright caps on revenue, as a consequence of the finance laws’
provisions freezing local tax rates.
Local authorities’ borrowing has been regulated by many legislative
acts over the years.16 Sub-national bodies may finance investment
expenditure by borrowing from the Deposits and Loans Fund or from
other financial intermediaries or by securities issues. This golden rule
is accompanied by administrative obligations (notification, the
requirement to submit a financial plan), constraints (no central or
regional government guarantee, restrictions on yields of local bonds
with respect to Treasury securities), and guarantee requirements
(guaranteed repayment out of current revenue). There is a cap on the
expansion of the local authorities’ debt in the form of a limit on the
ratio of interest payments to revenue.17 Local debt has never been
58
Francesca Gastaldi and Luisa Giuriato
explicitly covered by the Pact; references to it are indirect and always
couched in terms of rewards and sanctions. 
Essentially, the rules in force from 1999 through 2006 were ambivalent.
On the one hand they were quite rigid (reference to annual figures, no
safeguard or cyclical adjustment clauses, no rainy-day funds), but on the
other they lacked stringency (exemption of increasing numbers of
revenue and expenditure items, no consideration of outsourcing, weak
monitoring and sanctions, lack of information transparency). Thus the
high degree of compliance found by the State Audit Office may be best
interpreted as the consequence of the mildness of the rules rather than
the virtuous behaviour of the authorities. In its yearly reports to
Parliament, the Audit Office found a more than satisfactory, and
increasing, degree of compliance, in that every year the results were
better than the planning targets, above all for regions and provinces. 
However, this positive judgment is belied by a reading of the public
finance aggregate that is relevant to European controls, namely general
government net borrowing. The aggregate excessive deficits that Italy ran
from 2003 to 2006 were not entirely the doing of the central government.
Sub-national governments also contributed, while the social security
institutions almost always turned in a positive balance (Table 6). From
1998 to 2006 the net borrowing of local authorities was lower (in
proportion to GDP) than the central government deficit, but it gradually if
irregularly worsened over time, and together with the deterioration of the
central government finances this produced, in 2001 and then from 2003
onwards, overshoots of the Stability and Growth Pact ceiling. To comply
with the European standards, central government net borrowing was
lowered from 3.82 per cent of GDP in 2005 to 2.72 per cent in 2006, but
that of local governments rose from 0.85 to 1.13 per cent.
Responsibility for the worsening balance is not shared equally among
the various sub-national authorities. The largest role in the growth of
general government net borrowing was played by regions and the
local health units. And while the deficit of the provinces is small if
growing, that of the regions and health units is more substantial (0.54
and 0.25 per cent of GDP, respectively, in 2006) and ranges from
modest surpluses to large deficits. Net borrowing by municipalities, by
contrast, has trended downwards since 2004, being cut by 50 per cent
in three years.
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It might be presumed that the different types of constraint imposed
on the different sub-national units contributed to the difference in
budget performance. The constraint on the regions has always been
especially weak, because since 2002 there has only been a ceiling on
current expenditure, and with exemptions for a large number of items,
including health care. Even in 1999-2001, however, when the
constraint called for containing the deficit, the regional balance had
swung back and forth between surplus and deficit.
For municipalities and provinces, the worst results came in the years
from 2002 to 2004, when the Pact regulated the financial balance with a
golden rule that exempted capital expenditure. In 2002 the constraint
was so mild that the deficit actually increased by 2.5 per cent with
respect to the 2000 outturn; in 2003 the target for the municipalities was
merely an “improvement” on the balance registered in 2001.
Performance more in line with the aim of curbing the general
government deficit was achieved with the application of limits to final
expenditure in 2005 and 2006, but these distorted the composition of
expenditure, with a reduction in capital spending, especially for fixed
capital formation, which municipalities cut by 8.3 per cent and
provinces by 6 per cent. The next year, the caps distinguished between
current and capital expenditure, stabilizing municipal investment and
spurring that of the provinces, which rose by 4.2 per cent. Neither the
spending cap nor the constraint on the budget balance, by contrast,
appears to have affected current expenditure, which rose by an average
of 3.7 per cent per year in municipalities and 8 per cent in provinces.
Finally, it is worth observing the changes in the consolidated debt of
local administrations over the years of the Pact (Table 6), even though
this is governed by outside rules. The debt of the sub-national units has
never been a large component of total general government debt (6.9
per cent in 2006). But between 1999 and 2006 there was a considerable
increase, as local debt more than doubled in proportion to GDP and
rose from €32.7 billion to €108 billion, while central government debt
rose by 17.6 per cent. Local government debt thus increased even in
the years when total general government debt diminished, so that its
role in the overall expansion of debt was certainly significant.
Admittedly, the jump in debt registered between 2002 and 2003 was
largely an accounting change, reflecting the reclassification of the
18 Actually, this is not an annual adjustment, because it does not correct the budget balance for the
reference year on a current programmes basis but bears on a past average. Further, the calculation
is not linked to actual measures taken by the local authorities but serves only to determine the
target balance.
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Deposits and Loans Fund outside the general government sector, but
even so local government debt increased by two percentage points
between 2003 and 2006, from 5.35 to 7.33 per cent of GDP; at the same
time, the debt of regions and municipalities rose from just over 1 per
cent to about 3 per cent of GDP. The fastest rise was in provincial debt,
which nearly doubled.
In conclusion, the Pact plus limits to the taxing and debt-contracting
autonomy of the sub-national jurisdictions did not succeed in
controlling the net borrowing of provinces and above all of regions; it
did not affect the accounts of municipalities until the last few years, and
only at the cost of a distortion in the composition of expenditure; and it
failed to contain the debt trend of local government as a whole. 
5. The new rules of the Domestic Stability Pact for 2007-2010
The new Pact introduced by the 2007 and 2008 finance laws covers
the period through 2010. The rules for the ordinary-statute regions are
not much changed from the past, save for the return to a limit on final
expenditure in place of separate caps on current and capital spending.
The new Pact envisages experimentation with the regions and
autonomous provinces with a view to taking the financial balance as
the reference. Starting with 2008, the other regions too can use this
aggregate, on condition that the experimentation has shown positive
results for the attainment of the public finance targets.
The main changes in 2007 involved the treatment of provinces and of
municipalities with more than 5,000 population, which were subjected
to a constraint on the final budget balance, which must be complied with
in drafting the budget. In calculating the target balance, all budget items
are included, including investment expenditure (only credit collection
and loan disbursements are excluded). The new Pact distinguishes
between virtuous and non-virtuous administrations with reference to the
average result on a cash basis in the three years from 2003 through 2005
and differentiates the “annual adjustment” between the two.18 For units
19 If the 3-year average of capital revenue from disposals of real estate and securities (not counting
those earmarked for the early repayment of loans) is above 15 per cent of average final revenue,
the target adjustment amount is reduced by an amount equal to the difference (if positive)
between that revenue excess and the annual size of the adjustment, calculated using the
parameters laid down by the 2007 Finance Law.
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averaging a surplus, the annual amount of the “adjustment” for 2007 is
determined exclusively on the basis of average current expenditure in
2003-2005, and no adjustment is required for 2008. For those running
deficits on average, however, the adjustment is a weighted sum of the
average current expenditure for 2003-2005 and of the average budget
balance for those years. Hence, the adjustment is proportional. 
The inclusion of average cash outlays as a factor in determining the
size of the adjustment can be read as a proxy for the size of the entity
involved, in order to differentiate the requirement among entities with
the same absolute budget result. The spending cap goes beyond simple
compliance with the European Stability and Growth Pact and sets Italy’s
domestic rules apart from those of much of Europe. Implicitly, this type
of fiscal rule seems to aim at limiting the size of the local public sector,
which is probably necessary in Italy in that past performance does not
accurately reflect the fiscal position of these units.
The target balance is then calculated both on a cash and on an
accrual basis. It consists of the average balance (cash and accrual) for
2003-2005, increased by the amount of the adjustment and reduced (for
the 2003-2005 average) by any proceeds (on a cash and on an accrual
basis) from the disposal of assets in order to pay off loans. Also, for
municipalities only, a ceiling is placed on the size of the adjustment
each year, which must not exceed 8 per cent of the 2003-2005 average
of final expenditure (net of loans granted). Finally, starting in 2008,
municipalities and provinces with a budget surplus will benefit from a
further reduction in the calculation of their target balance, if they made
large asset disposals in 2003-2005.19 The arithmetic of the 2008 Pact for
municipalities is shown in Table 7. That for the provinces is similar,
save for the lack of a ceiling on the size of the adjustment.
The 2007 Pact has no flexibility, and for effectiveness it requires that the
budget constraint to which it applies itself be rigid. But given a large fiscal
gap, rigid expenditure commitments and limited tax autonomy, this
requirement cannot be met. Recognition of this rigidity prompted the
62
Francesca Gastaldi and Luisa Giuriato
introduction, for 2008-2010, of a new, more flexible way of determining
the balance to be used both in calculating the adjustment and in
calculating the budget objective. The new balance, described as on a
“mixed accrual basis”, is defined as the sum of the balance on an accrual
basis for the current account and on a cash basis for the capital account
(net of the proceeds of credit collections and of outlays for loans granted).
The new version of the Pact improves monitoring over all local
governments and modifies the sanction machinery, which now
envisages the automatic raising of some local tax rates (the regional
petrol tax and automobile taxes, the municipal surcharge on income
tax and the provincial transcription tax) and publication of the list of
non-compliant authorities. The fact that the sanctions are automatic
toughens the Pact significantly; until now, there had been ample scope
for discretion, undermining its credibility. Still, the fact that sanctions
are not commensurate with the magnitude of the violation is a major
incentive for overshooting the budget objectives (Zanardi, 2007).
5.1 Observations on the Domestic Pact’s general approach. First, one is
struck by the backward-looking design of the fiscal rule. Reference to
the average balance for 2003-2005 has the virtue of preventing
opportunism on the part of the local authorities, which can no longer
affect those figures. But it also binds the control of local finances to
results that will recede further and further in time but which are
assumed to be representative of “a financial situation that is correctly
framed with respect to the determination of expenditure requirements
and/or the adequacy of the fiscal effort” (Bosi et al., 2003, p. 9).
However, this backward-looking approach does not necessarily reward
the authorities that make the greatest fiscal effort or exert the most
control over spending, while it can reward those that receive the most
transfers. Further, the failure to consider current programmes budget
projections essentially eliminates incentives to improve resource use in
the future and does not help to better the quality of budgets.
Another problem is that, holding the amount of the deficit constant,
authorities are differentiated only according to absolute current
expenditure; the constraints ignore other factors in deficits, such as the
incidence of capital expenditure and the fiscal effort. Further, the Pact
sets out its constraints in absolute terms, thus failing to take account of
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differences in the size, population, or gross product of the various sub-
national units. This constitutes a fundamental difference from the
European Pact, whose constraints are all normalized as a percentage of
GDP, and from the manner in which the other euro-area countries
specify the contribution of single segments to the achievement of the
overall external objective. What is more, the rules do not get at
anomalous budget positions – possibly indicated by excessive
spending on a per capita basis – but on the contrary preserve them, in
that adjustment is proportional to the absolute value of the deficit.
Aside from greater flexibility, no significant correction can be
expected from the use of the “mixed accrual” balance for 2008-2010.
The result of the combination of two partial balances computed on two
different bases can be erratic. And the new definition of the “mixed
accrual” targets will certainly affect the behaviour of the local
governments, which will seek to comply with the constraint by acting
on current account items on the cash side and capital account items on
the accrual side. The outcome is hard to forecast, and in any case a far
cry from normal administrative practice.
Lastly, there is still no coordination with the constraints on debt,
which is included only indirectly, and only for the past, in determining
local public finance objectives. In fact, the average amount of asset
disposals in 2003-2005 reduces the adjustment target by the amount
allocated for early repayment of loans. This clause, which takes
account of the effort made to reduce the debt in 2003-2005, offers no
incentive for greater reductions in the future but is only a sort of ex-
post reward, and quite a large one, given that disposals during the
relevant years were substantial.
In conclusion, the new rules are complex, pursuing a multiplicity of
aims: to mitigate the adverse effect that spending ceilings have had in
the past, to make the domestic and external targets more similar, to
differentiate the treatment of municipalities and provinces according to
their fiscal virtue, and to avoid making local budgets excessively rigid,
thanks to the expression of targets in terms of budget balances and the
introduction of the “mixed accrual” basis for budget balances. The new
version of the Domestic Stability Pact nevertheless has features that are
not found in the experience of other euro-area countries and that are
still far from instituting a true sharing of the external constraint.
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6. Conclusion
The basic weakness of the controls imposed on Italian local
government entities between 1999 and 2006 is the absence, nine years
after the initial Domestic Stability Pact, of a well established,
consolidated set of constraints, serving as an effective tool of control in
the hands of central government but also as a planning instrument at
the lower levels. In the sequence of variants of the Pact, one is struck
by the variability of the adjustments required, very large in some years
and much less in others; the weakness of monitoring and sanctions for
non-compliance; the lack of an explicit agreement on the portion of the
adjustment assigned to the central and to the local governments, so that
the latter never had a clear overall result to attain. Further, the local
entities are bound not only by the Pact but by other constraints as well,
both on own revenue and on borrowing, and there is no coordination
between these sets of rules and limits.
The approaches taken by other European countries are highly
diversified as regards the definition of budget constraints, control and
monitoring procedures, and sanctions. But a common course can be
identified: a stronger tendency than in Italy to make the domestic rules
consistent with the European Stability and Growth Pact.
In the euro-area countries, the degree of decentralization has affected
the determination of domestic constraints and the results. Belgium and
Germany, which are highly decentralized, have taken a cooperative
approach, with good results in Belgium, less so in Germany owing to the
large fiscal gap and a less clear assignment of responsibilities between
levels of government. In Austria, the strictness and autonomy of budget
policies are counterbalanced by the possibility of transferring portions of
deficit from one entity to another. This mechanism has increased the
involvement of local bodies in maintaining macroeconomic equilibrium,
but the aggregate results have almost never fulfilled the planning targets.
The adoption of a comparable system in Italy, in the current situation,
would require a high degree of coordination, transparency and control
over the budget trends of the authorities involved, but it would have the
advantage of making the allocation of capital expenditure and debt more
efficient (Giarda et al., 2005).  
Perhaps the most suggestive experience is that of Spain, where the
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attribution of powers to the lower levels of government has been quite
recent. The Domestic Stability Pact entails a rule set by the central
government, but only after a phase of negotiations that has taken on
added importance since 2005. However, Spain has a better balance
than Italy between spending responsibility and fiscal autonomy. This
narrows the fiscal gap, and in 2005 it made it possible to relax the
rigidity of the rule by setting multi-year objectives and adopting a
golden rule.
One factor that should be borne in mind in formulating a Domestic
Stability Pact is suggested by the Belgian experience: the credibility of
procedures, both in the fixing of objectives, which is done by
independent forecasting methods, and in the phase of control and
monitoring. In this context, one must not play down the elements of
budget predictability and controllability that may be undermined by
inconsistent accounting standards. Relying on an ex-post reconstruction
of the accounts by ESA95 standards weakens the procedure for setting
objectives and even more so that of budget control, which is often only
partial. And above all, it does not result in a reliable valuation. These
problems are found not only in Italy but also in Germany, whereas
Belgium, Austria and Spain set their objectives with explicit reference
to ESA95. 
The fiscal rules introduced in Italy starting in 2007 will not
significantly alter the constraints on the ordinary-statute regions, at
least not until the experimental phase with the special-statue regions
and provinces has been completed. In the future, this trial could lead to
a different way of setting the fiscal rules. The rules for lower levels of
government have been considerably changed, however. These
authorities are now distinguished on the basis of budget outturns and
bound to an objective defined in terms of the budget balance,
practically without excluding any items. The objective is calculated as a
correction to an average of past outturns, an “adjustment” that is the
resultant of a dual proportional reduction, bearing on the average
budget balance and average current expenditure. The limit on
spending goes beyond simple compliance with the European Stability
and Growth Pact, setting Italy’s domestic rules apart from those of
many other European countries. As far as the objectives of various
fiscal rules are concerned, this appears to be an implicit limit to the
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magnitude of the local public sector, which is probably necessary in
Italy in that the true fiscal situation of the local entities is not completely
expressed by their past budget balances.
The 2007 fiscal rule is totally inflexible, and if applied with a rigid
budget balance constraint it requires a sharp correction in terms of own
revenue and expenditure. To attenuate this rigidity, the rules for 2008-
2010 have abandoned this correction for entities that, on the average,
have had surpluses in the past and allowed the others broader scope for
action by setting the objective in terms of a new, “mixed accrual” basis.
This basis for calculating the balance, which is not used in the other
European countries, is a pure accounting artifice designed to allow some
flexibility, and it accentuates the difference between the variables used in
actual budget management and those referred to in the Domestic Stability
Pact. The issue of flexibility in the fiscal rules for local government,
therefore, needs to be rethought; the design should be more transparent
and should correspond better to administrative practice.
Finally, the constraints should take account of the volume of
expenditures that the local administrations consider indispensable,
which cannot be reduced beyond a certain point. As Bosi et al. (2003)
suggested, this means determining an amount of resources that must
be allocated to local governments to satisfy these spending needs
sufficiently with respect to other governments at the same level and
with respect to what can be considered a fair and adequate fiscal
adjustment effort. The need, that is, is to design the Domestic Stability
Pact not only in order for compliance with Italy’s European
commitments but also for consistency with the nature of Italian
decentralization and the desired model of federalism.
REFERENCES
AHMAD, E., M. ALBINO-WAR and R. SINGH (2005), Sub-national public financial
management: institutions and macroeconomic considerations, in E. AHMAD and G.
BROSIO (eds.) “Handbook of Fiscal Federalism”, E.Elgar, Cheltenham (UK) and
Northampton (USA), pp. 405-427.
AMBROSANIO M. F. and M. BORDIGNON (2007), Internal Stability Pacts: The European
Experience, European Economic Governance Monitor, Papers.
BALASSONE, F., M. DEGNI and G. SALVEMINI (2002), “Regole di bilancio, Patto di Stabilità
Interno e autonomia delle Amministrazioni Locali”, Rassegna Parlamentare, no.3.
67
•The Domestic Stability Pact: Assessment of the Italian experience and comparison with the other EMU countries 
BALASSONE, F. and D. FRANCO (2001), “Fiscal Federalism and the Stability and Growth
Pact: a difficult union”, Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice, XVII (2-3),
pp.135-163.
BORDIGNON, M., P. MANASSE and G. TABELLINI (2001), “Optimal regional redistribution
under asymmetric information”, American Economic Review, 91/3, pp.709-723.
BOSI, P., M.T. GUERRA and M. MATTEUZZI (2003), Patto di Stabilità e Crescita e Patto di
Stabilità Interno: lezioni dall’Europea e Proposte di riforma nella prospettiva della
Finanziaria per il 2004, Centro di Analisi delle Politiche Pubbliche, Modena. 
BRETON, A. (1977), “A theory of local government finance and the debt regulation of
local government”, Public Finance, 32, pp.16-28.
CASELLA, A. (1999), “Tradable deficit permits: efficient implementation of the Stability
Pact in the EMU”, Economic Policy, pp. 323-361.
COMMISSIONE TECNICA PER LA SPESA PUBBLICA (2001), Note e raccomandazioni: finanza
regionale e locale e “Patto di stabilità interno”, Rome. 
DAFFLON, B. (2002), “The requirement of a balanced budget and borrowing limits in
local public finance: setting out the problem”, in B. DAFFLON (ed.) Local Public Finance
in Europe, E.Elgar, Cheltenham (UK) and Northampton (USA), pp. 1-14.
EICHENGREEN, B. and J. VON HAGEN (1996) “Fiscal Policy and Monetary Union: Is There a
Trade-off between Federalism and Budgetary Restriction?”, NBER Working Papers, no. 5517.
FARBER G. (2002), “Local government borrowing in Germany”, in B. Dafflon, op. cit.,
pp. 135-164.
GASTALDI, F., GIURIATO L. and RAPALLINI C. (2007), Rapporto sulla Finanza Locale del
Lazio CGIL, Rome.
GIARDA, D.P., PETRETTO A. and PISAURO G. (2005), “Elementi per una politica di governo
della spesa pubblica”, Paper to the Conference Oltre il declino, Fondazione R. De
Benedetti, Camera dei Deputati, Rome.
GILBERT G. and GUENGANT A. (2002), “The public debt of local governments in France”,
in B. Dafflon, op. cit., pp. 115-134.
ISAE (2007), Finanza pubblica e istituzioni, Rome.
JOUMARD, I., R. PRICE and D. SOUTHERLAND (2005), “Fiscal Rules for Sub-central
Governments: Design and Impact”, OECD Economics Department Working Papers, no.
465, OECD Publishing.
LUBKE A. (2005), “Fiscal Discipline between Levels of Government in Germany”, OECD
Journal on Budgeting, vol.5 no.2, pp.23-37.
MIAJA M. (2005), “Fiscal Discipline in a Decentralised Administration: the Spanish
Experience”, OECD Journal on Budgeting, vol. 5 no.2, pp.39-54.
PATRIZII, V., C. RAPALLINI and G. ZITO, (2006), “I ‘patti’ di stabilità Interni”, Rivista di
diritto finanziario e scienza delle finanze, Vol. LXV Fasc.1-2006, pp. 156-189.
PERSSON, T. and G. TABELLINI (1996), “Federal fiscal constitutions: risk sharing and moral
hazard”, Ecomometrica, 64/3, pp.623-46.
PISAURO, G. (2001) “Intergovernmental relations and fiscal discipline: between common
and soft budget constraints”, IMF Working Papers 01/65.
68
Francesca Gastaldi and Luisa Giuriato
PISAURO, G. (2002), “Fiscal decentralization and the budget process” SIEP XIV
Conference paper, pp. 688-713.
RAPALLINI C. (2007), “Il Patto di Stabilità Interno: gli accord e le norme adottati in alcuni
paesi UE”, Mimeo.
RODDEN, J. (2002), “The dilemma of fiscal federalism: grants and fiscal performance
around the world”, American Journal of Political Science, 46.
ROSSI, S. and B. DAFFLON (2002), “The theory of sub-national balanced budget and debt
control” in B. DAFFLON, op. cit., pp. 15-44.
TER-MINASSIAN, T. and J. CRAIG (1997), “Controls of sub-national government
borrowing”, in T. TER-MINASSIAN (ed.) Fiscal Federalism in Theory and Practice, IMF,
Washington, D.C., pp.156-172. 
THONI E., G. GARBISLANDER and D.J. HAAS (2002), “Local budgeting and local borrowing
in Austria” in B. DAFFLON, op. cit., pp. 45-74.
VANNESTE J. (2002), “Local public finance  in Belgium: structure, budgets and debts”, in
B. DAFFLON, op. cit., pp. 75-92.
WEINGAST, R.B., K.A. SHEPSLE and C. JOHNSEN (1981), “The Political Economy of Benefits
and Costs: a Neoclassical Approach to Distributive Politics”, Journal of Political
Economy, 89/4, pp. 642-664.
WILDASIN, D.E. (1997), “Externalities and Bailouts. Hard and soft Budget Constraints in
Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations”, World Bank, Fiscal Policy Working Papers, no.
1843.
ZANARDI, A. (2007), “Federalismo fiscale: si riparte?”, in M.C. Guerra and A. Zanardi
(eds.), La finanza pubblica italiana- Rapporto 2007, Il Mulino, Bologna, pp.127-154.
Appendix
The Domestic Stability Pact: Assessment of the Italian experience 
and comparison with the other EMU countries 

71
•The Domestic Stability Pact: Assessment of the Italian experience and comparison with the other EMU countries 
Figure 1 - Models of sharing an external objective at local level
Fonte: Eurobarometro
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of the regional governments
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External objective
FIGURE 1a
FIGURE 1b
Internal rules for the division of the objective between the entities
Division of the regional objective 
between the municipalities belonging
to the region
Definition of the contribution of each region
to achieving the external objective
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Table 1 – General government net borrowing and debt by government level in selected
EMU countries (as a % of GDP)
Net borrowing Debt
Federal countries 1995 2001 2005 1995 2001 2005
Austria -5.6 0.0 -1.5 67.9 66.0 63.5
Central gov’t. -5.2 -0.7 -1.8 nd. n. d. 59.6
States/regions 0.1 0.5 0.1 n. d. n. d. 3.0
Local gov’ts. -0.5 0.3 0.2 n. d. n. d. 2.0
Belgium -4.4 0.6 -2.3 129.8 106.5 92.1
Central gov’t. -3.7 -0.8 -2.4 118.1 100.0 85.8
States/regions -0.8 0.8 0.3 9.1 6.5 4.3
Local gov’ts. 0.3 -0.1 -0.1 6.0 5.5 5.2
Germany -3.3 -2.8 -3.4 55.6 58.8 67.8
Central gov’t. -1.9 -1.3 -2.1 n. d. n. d. 41.6
States/regions -1.1 -1.3 -1.0 n. d. n. d. 21.5
Local gov’ts. 0.0 -0.1 0.0 n. d. n. d. 5.3
Spain -6.5 -0.6 1.0 62.7 55.5 43
Central gov’t. -5.5 -0.8 0.2 n. d. n. d. 36.4
States/regions -0.6 -0.6 -0.3 n. d. n. d. 6.3
Local gov’ts. 0.0 0.0 -0.1 n. d. n. d. 2.8
Unitary countries
Finland -6.2 5.0 2.9 56.7 42.3 41.3
Central gov’t. -11.3 1.9 0.6 n. d. n. d. 39.1
Local gov’ts. 1.3 -0.4 -0.6 n. d. n. d. 5.3
France -5.5 -1.5 -2.9 55.5 56.9 66.4
Central gov’t. -4.5 -2.1 -2.6 45.2 51.0 59.8
Local gov’ts. -0.2 0.1 -0.2 9.3 7.1 7.0
Italy -7.4 -3.1 -4.2 121.2 108.7 105.8
Central gov’t. -7.5 -3.1 -3.8 119.5 104.7 99.9
Local gov’ts. 0.1 -0.3 -0.9 5.2 3.3 6.3
Netherlands -1.9 -0.2 -0.3 76.1 50.7 54.8
Central gov’t. -1.5 -0.2 0.1 n. d. n. d. 46.8
Local gov’ts. 0.2 -0.1 -0.2 n. d. n. d. 8.0
Source: Based on Eurostat and Bank of Italy data.
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Table 4 – Characteristics of decentralization in Italy relevant 
to choice of sub-national fiscal rule
Regions Municipalities 
and provinces
Revenue responsibility
(own revenues as % of total)
48.8 32.9
Control of rates
and tax base
61.0 84.9
Revenue sharing 5.0
None 34.0 15.1
Expenditure responsibility
(% of total gen’l gov’t)
21.6 10.9
Education 12.3 14.1
Health 98.4
Welfare
(excl. pensions)
1.9 13.1
Current expenditure exempt 
13.9
58.8 (Provinces)
from Pact (%) - 2005 61.3 (Municipalities)
Capital expenditure as %
of final expenditure (%) - 2005
16.2 27.9
Gross fixed investment
14.3
8.0 (Provinces)
as % of gen’l gov’t expend (%) - 2005 45.9 (Municipalities)
Degree of structural rigidity % (*) 37.9 (30.6)
51.0 (31.2) Municipalities
34.9 (23.0) Provinces
(*) Defined as: (staff costs + debt service) / current revenue; in brackets, staff costs as percentage of current revenue.
Tax revenue 
according 
to possibility 
of control (% of total)
Tax 
authonomy
Expenditure
Politically sensitive
spending (% of total
by function)
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Table 6 – General government and local authority net borrowing and debt, 
1999-2006 (% of GDP) 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006*
NET BORROWING/GDP
Central gov’t 1.45 1.14 3.09 2.99 2.96 2.94 3.82 2.72
Local authorities 0.59 0.14 0.28 0.81 0.45 0.98 0.85 1.13
Regions 0.21 -0.18 0.12 0.03 -0.06 0.31 0.08 0.54
Provinces 0.04 -0.01 0.04 0.11 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.11
Municipalities 0.28 0.23 0.23 0.29 0.31 0.27 0.18 0.11
Local health units 0.14 0.18 -0.02 0.34 0.04 0.24 0.45 0.25
Other local entities -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.11
Soc. sec. inst’s -0.31 -0.45 -0.29 -0.93 0.08 -0.45 -0.44 -0.49
GEN’L GOV’T 1.73 0.84 3.08 2.86 3.49 3.47 4.23 3.36
NET BORROWING COMPOSITION OF RATE OF INCREASE
Central gov’t -25.26 -14.05 250.88 0.20 2.26 3.06 28.11 -23.65
Local authorities 13.30 -25.39 18.30 18.04 -12.00 16.41 -3.01 7.48
Regions 8.24 -23.23 36.68 -2.74 -3.18 11.03 -6.79 11.53
Provinces 0.72 -2.81 6.02 2.30 -0.33 1.43 -0.93 0.18
Municipalities 1.19 -2.37 1.39 2.47 1.12 -1.09 -2.29 -1.52
Local health units 4.81 3.25 -24.58 12.00 -10.11 5.94 6.33 -4.48
Other local entities -1.66 -0.23 -1.20 4.01 0.51 -0.90 0.67 1.77
Soc. sec. inst’s -23.90 -9.61 17.30 -21.92 35.43 -15.83 -0.02 -1.69
GEN’L GOV’T -35.86 -49.04 286.48 -3.68 25.70 3.64 25.08 -17.86
DEBT/GDP
Central gov’t 110.70 105.35 104.74 101.54 98.72 98.16 99.86 99.46
Local authorities 2.90 3.29 3.32 3.59 5.35 5.54 6.33 7.33
Debt Regions 1.31 1.49 1.54 1.72 2.07 2.19 2.40 3.06
Debt Provinces° n.d. 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.36 0.41 0.51 0.59
Debt 
Municipalities 1.31 1.29 1.26 1.29 2.50 2.54 2.87 3.07
Debt other local 
entities 0.28 0.38 0.39 0.43 0.42 0.40 0.55 0.61
Soc. sec. inst’s 0.01 0.51 0.64 0.42 0.21 0.10 0.00 0.00
Debt GEN’L GOV’T 113.62 109.16 108.70 105.56 104.27 103.80 106.20 106.79
DEBT: COMPOSITION OF RATE OF INCREASE
Central gov’t 0.55 4.08 0.54 0.22 3.35 3.89 3.07
Local authorities 0.51 0.17 0.38 1.82 0.40 0.90 1.19
Debt Regioni 0.23 0.12 0.22 0.39 0.20 0.25 0.73
Debt Provinces° 0.12 0.01 0.03 0.21 0.06 0.11 0.09
Debt Comuni 0.05 0.02 0.08 1.21 0.14 0.38 0.29
Debt other local entities 0.11 0.03 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.15 0.08
Soc. sec. inst’s 0.46 0.15 -0.18 -0.20 -0.09 -0.10 0.00
Debt GEN’L GOV’T 1.53 4.40 0.73 1.84 3.66 4.70 4.26
Sources: Based on data from Istat, Conti ed aggregati economici delle Amministrazioni Pubbliche (June 2008) and
Banca d’Italia, Supplementi al Bollettino Statistico – Finanza Pubblica, Nos. 61-06, 62-07 and 17-08, and Banca d’I-
talia annual reports, various years.
* The data for 2006 have been revised (Istat, press release of 29 Feb. 2008) downwards to 3.4 per cent of GDP; but
disaggregation by level of government is not yet available.
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Table 7 – Calculation of target budget balances for municipalities
2008 Finance Law 
Deficit municipalities AB< 0
Surplus
municipalities AB> 0
Criterion for 
application of  
α |AB |+ β curr.B > 0.08 Final B Δ > 0
adjustment  
Cap not applicable Cap applicable
Reduction not  Reduction
cap/reduction applicable applicable
Annual  
α |AB |+ β curr.E 0.08 FinalE. = 0 [Δ- β curr.E]adjustment 0.08 (curr.E + cap.E) if >0
Target  Bmix (1 + α )+ β curr.E– AB + 0.08 Final E. - x 
Smix- x Disp
Smix -
balance x Disp. Disp. [Δ- βcurr.E]
Notes. The values of α are set at 0.205 for 2008 and 0.155 for 2009 and 2010. The values of β are set at 0.017 for
2008 and 0.013 for 2009 and 2010.   
AB: average, 2003-2005, of balance on a cash basis. Bmix: average, 2003-2005, of balance on a mixed accrual ba-
sis. Curr.E.: average, 2003-2005, current expenditure on a cash basis (Title I). Final E: average, 2003-05, of final ex-
penditure. Cap.E.: average, 2003-2005, capital expenditure (Title II). Disp: average, 2003-2005, of capital revenue
on a cash basis from disposals of real estate and other assets x: share of disposals allocated to early repayment of
loans. Δ = [ (1-x) Disp - 0,15 fR], where fR is final revenue.

